

13, 6

28 February 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: A Plan for Strategic Intelligence

1. The single most important job of intelligence is to support the administration in the achievement of its strategic objectives vis-a-vis the USSR and other nuclear powers. The CIA is hampered in doing this by the dispersal of strategic intelligence analysis in four offices (OSI, FMSAC, OSR and ONE) which themselves are in three parts of the organization (DDI, DDS&T, and DCI area).

2. To remedy this OSI, FMSAC, OSR, and part of ONE should be brought together in one directorate, either that of the DDI or the DDS&T, or as a new one. The DDS&T is the logical choice, because Carl Duckett:

- a. has the confidence of the DCI,
- b. has established his credibility with Dr. Kissinger and the NSC Staff,
- c. already controls OSI and FMSAC, and
- d. has exercised de facto control of OSR in strategic matters.

3. Merely changing the organization this way would not do the whole job. The DDS&T has other duties aside from those involving strategic intelligence. To strengthen the strategic intelligence effort, one person should be assigned to manage it full time. This could be done by having the DDS&T organized into two sub-directorates, with an A/DD/S&T responsible for each one. There would be:

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**DD/S&T  
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a. a grouping of offices involved in technical collection and processing (OSP, OSA, OEL, ORD and OCS), and

b. a grouping of offices involved in strategic analysis (OSI, FMSAC, OSR, and part of ONE).

4. The new A/DD/S&T for Strategic Intelligence should be able to:

a. integrate and reorganize the work of the offices, redistributing people and responsibilities as necessary;

b. provide more responsive support to the DCI and the NSC;

c. organize special teams for such matters as SALT, MBFR, and NSSMs having to do with strategic planning; and

d. organize a net assessment effort.

5. The problem of handling the strategic weapons estimates is a special one. These estimates need to be managed by people with scientific and technical backgrounds; yet none of the members of the present Board of National Estimates are scientists. A way to handle this problem might be to divest the Board of National Estimates of the responsibility for strategic weapons estimates. Instead, the A/DD/S&T for Strategic Intelligence and his Office Chiefs could constitute an Ad Hoc Board for each strategic weapons estimate. The number of such estimates is small and could be handled as a part-time effort.

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Director

Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center

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